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Abstract 
 
Structuralism was once the fashion in semiotics, and then it was abandoned without its 
advantages and disadvantages having been properly assessed. Poststructuralism, 
imperceptibly merging with postmodernism, perpetuated many of the latter, but 
spurned most of the former. In this sense, it never went beyond structuralism. In my 
book Pictorial concepts (1989), I have evaluated the contributions and the drawbacks 
of structuralism pertaining to the domain of pictorial semiotics. Here I want to make a 
more general point. Structure, as first defined in structural linguistics, and generalized 
by the Prague school, is a very particular kind of whole, which for instance is not simply 
identified with the whole as defined by Gestalt psychology. Therefore, structure has to 
be studied within a more complete mereological framework, that is, within the science 
of parts and their relation to the whole, first defined by Tardowski and Husserl. As a 
case in point, we will consider use of the notion of structure in the work of Lévi-Strauss, 
which was an exemplary work in the transition from linguistics to other semiotic 
domains, but which already constitutes a deviation with respect to its meaning in 
linguistics. 
 
Le structuralisme, une fois à la mode dans la sémiotique, a été abandonné sans que 
ses avantages et ses inconvénients aient été sérieusement pondérés. Le 
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poststructuralisme, fusionné indistinctement avec le postmodernisme, a perpétué les 
aspects négatifs, tout en a rejetant les aspects positifs. En ce sens, il n’est jamais allé 
au-delà du structuralisme. Dans mon livre Pictorial concepts (1989), j’ai évalué les 
apports et les inconvénients du structuralisme dans le domaine de la sémiotique de 
l’image. Ici, je voudrais présenter quelques considérations plus générales. La structure, 
telle qu’elle est définie dans la linguistique structurale et puis généralisée par l'École de 
Prague, est une manière tout à fait particulière de concevoir une totalité, qui ne peut 
pas, par exemple, être simplement identifiée avec la notion caractérisée par la 
psychologie de forme. La structure doit donc être étudiée dans un cadre méréologique 
plus complet, c'est-à-dire à l’intérieur de la science des parties et des totalités d’abord 
définie par Tardowski et Husserl. Comme un cas caractéristique, nous envisageons 
l'utilisation de la structure dans l’œuvre de Lévi-Strauss, qui a effectué, d’une façon 
exemplaire, le passage de ce concept de la linguistique à d'autres champs 
sémiotiques, mais déjà avec une déviation par rapport à son sens linguistique. 
 
 
 
Lo strutturalismo, una volta di moda in semiotica, è stato poi abbandonato senza 
essere adeguatamente valutato circa i suoi vantaggi e svantaggi. Il poststrutturalismo, 
fondendosi indistintamente con il postmodernismo, ha perpetuato molti degli aspetti 
negativi, e invece ha rigettato gran parte di quelli positivi. In questo senso non è andato 
mai oltre lo strutturalismo. Nel mio libro Pictorial concepts (1989) ho valutato sia i 
contributi sia i limiti dello strutturalismo relativamente al campo della semiotica 
pittorica. Qui, invece, voglio fare delle considerazioni di ordine più generale. La 
struttura, come è stata definita in un primo momento dalla linguistica strutturale, e 
quindi generalizzata dalla scuola di Praga, è un concetto molto particolare di totalità, 
che, ad esempio, non è semplicemente identificabile con quello definito dalla 
psicologia della Gestalt. Questo cencetto deve quindi essere studiato in un più 
completo quadro mereologico, cioè all'interno di quella scienza delle parti e della 
relazione con l’intero, delineata per la prima volta da Tardowski e Husserl. Prenderemo 
in considerazione specificamente l’uso della nozione di struttura nell’opera di Lévi-
Strauss, esemplare nella sua transizione dalla linguistica ad altri campi semiotici, ma 
che già in sé ne costituisce una deviazione rispetto sua accezione linguistica.  
 
 
 
 
There have been many structuralisms, within psychology, sociology, 
mathematics, biology, literary studies, and so on, each with a different 
character. Here we will only be concerned with one of those, the one 
originating within linguistics and then spreading to semiotics, via 
anthropology and literary studies. When Saussure claimed that language was 
a structure, he clearly meant two things: language is a whole, and all 
elements of this whole are (entirely or partly) determined by being parts of 
this whole. Thus, two elements are involved: the whole and the relations 
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holding within it. This is the kind of structuralism, which was generalized to 
the Prague school (cf. Galan 1984). Roman Jakobson, after his Prague 
period, added binarism to this conception. According to Jakobson, all 
relations within the whole are oppositions, and they are all made up of two 
terms or, to be more exact, a term and its absence. In actual practice, this 
also meant that the terms were entirely determined by these oppositions, in 
the sense in which Saussure, in one of his more speculative moments, 
muses that language is entirely made up of negative terms (though Jakobson 
1976 himself explicitly claimed this applies only to phonological, not 
semantic, oppositions). Once everything is made up of private oppositions, 
meaning can be conceived as purely formal. Louis Hjelmslev (1943) was 
most explicit on this theme, but others, such as A.J. Greimas and Claude 
Lévi-Strauss, have claimed to follow suite. This is the kind of structuralism 
that was generalized (or was meant to be generalized) within French 
structuralism. 
In the following, we will scrutinize these two ingredients of structure, 
the whole and its relations. This will involve exploring the difference between 
structure, stemming from the Saussurean tradition in linguistics, and 
configuration (i.e. Gestalt) originating in German psychology at the beginning 
of the 20th century. We will then analyse the notion of opposition, suggesting 
that identity statements should be put on the same level. There follows a 
study of the celebrated analysis accomplished by Lévi-Strauss, in order to 
show that it goes well beyond structure and posits meanings of another kind, 
more iconical, certainly, and, in particular, deriving from the Lifeworld, the 
world taken for granted. In fact, outside the domain of phonology and other 
possible purely formal domains, structure, in the strict sense, is regulative, 
rather than constitutive, of meanings.  
 
1. The theory of wholes and of relations 
It is characteristic of wholes to be made up of parts. At least this 
would seem to be the ordinary case. Thus, a human body is made up or a 
head, a trunk, two arms and two legs. Each one of them can be considered a 
new whole and further divided into parts, the head, for instance, into eyes, 
nose, mouth, ears, etc. The nose, in its turn, could be segmented into the tip 
of the nose, the root of the nose, the nasal cavities, etc., and we could go one 
with any of these parts being another whole, though we may not readily have 
terms for the new parts. The theory of parts and wholes, also termed 
mereology, was the subject of discussion among thinkers like Meinong, 
Tardowski and Husserl at the end of the 19th century, and was then given a 
logical formulation by Lesniewski (cf. Simons 1987; Cavallin 1990). Husserl’s 
(1901) contribution consisted in making the distinction between independent 
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and dependant parts (real parts and “moments”, respectively). Since 
dependence may be mutual or unilateral, the result is the same three-fold 
distinction made by Hjelmslev (1943) within his glossematic structuralism, as 
Stjernfelt (2007: 167ff) judiciously remarks. Starting out from such a whole as 
the human body, it may not be quite strait-forward to determine, which, if any, 
part, is not mutually dependant on the others. A wart, nevertheless, is 
dependent on the nose and not vice-versa.  
1.1.  Two kinds of wholes: structure and configuration 
The notion of whole is itself ambiguous. Different notions of 
wholeness, viz. structure and configuration, as conceived by structural 
linguistics and Gestalt psychology respectively, are often confused. As early 
as 1947, Jan Mukařovský (1974:7ff; cf. 20ff) insisted on the importance of 
distinguishing “structure” from the kind of wholes conceived by “holism”, 
observing that while a structural whole results from the mutual relations 
between its components, including negative ones, a holistic whole is primarily 
a delimitation made in the field, a setting up of borders, from which an inner 
differentiation may later ensue. In both cases, to be more precise, the whole 
is really something more than its parts, as the Gestaltist saying goes, but in 
the structure it is the network of relations which is central, and the elements 
connected by the relations will thus appear to be more distinct from (though 
sometimes identical to) each other; in the configuration, however, the general 
idea of wholeness and of all the elements’ belonging together predominates, 
and the elements themselves are only secondarily apprehended as separate 
parts (cf. Sonesson 1989: 81ff). Thus, in the configuration, the parts tend to 
disappear in favour of the whole; in the structure, it is the whole that 
impresses its properties on the parts.  
There are precursors for this view within German holistic psychology 
itself. As early as 1906, Krueger (as cited by Wellek in Weinhandl, ed. 
1960:385) criticizes the all too general use of the term “Gestalt” to designates 
all kinds of wholes and proposes a distinction between wholes distinctly 
moulded to a particular shape and wholes in a more general sense 
(“Ganzheit”). Emotions, as well as the experiences of small children, are non-
configurational wholes. All wholes are oversummative, Wellek suggests, but 
only configurations are transposable. It is not clear, however, that the 
wholeness itself, i.e. the atmosphere, could not be transposed. Other criteria 
are proposed by Volkelt (in Sander & Volkelt 1962:43ff): a typical 
configuration stands out from a background and is internally articulated 
(“gegliedert”), but other holistic properties may well be externally and 
internally diffuse (“aussen- und binnendiffus”).  
Rudolf Arnheim (1969: 60ff) who, like many followers of the Gestalt 
school, sometimes uses “structure” in the sense given here to “configuration”, 
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tells us the square in Fig. 1a will seem somewhat less straight because of the 
influence from the reclining V in which it has been inscribed; this, I submit, is 
a typical configurational effect. But when a second square is added, as in Fig. 
1b, the relationship between the two squares will stand out, creating a 
structural effect. Another way of obtaining a structure that more decisively 
destroys the configuration would be to apply a ruler to the borders of the 
square, thus introducing a continuous series of relations between points on 
the ruler and points on the contours of the square. Indeed, from the 
interaction of the configuration and the structure, complex meanings may be 
derived. Groupe μ (1992:352f) tells us that the waves and Mount Fuji in 
Hokusai’s “The Wave” are seen as different when they are interpreted as 
such, but on another “isotopy” they are identified because of the similarity of 
their triangular shape, both having the point turned upwards, and of their 
colour, which is blue stained with white spots. From our point of view, if might 
be added that the waves as well as the mountain immediately form 
configurations in perception, while the organization of the picture makes the 
structural relation between one of the waves and the mountain stand out. 
This should serve to make the difference between structure and configuration 
clear. 
 
 
1.2. Different kinds of oppositions 
The notion of opposition in closely wedded to the idea of structure in 
linguistics. Saussure famously claimed that in the language system, there are 
only differences without positive terms. Every element derives its identity 
from its distinction to other elements in the same system. The phonemes, in 
particular, Saussure said, are units that are purely oppositive, relative, and 
negative. This conception was brought to its extreme by the Copenhagen 
school, when Hjelmslev claimed that language could be analysed 
independently of its “substance”, i.e. whether conveyed by speech, writing, or 
some kind of flags or manual signs. 
The Prague school took a less radical stance on this issue. In his 
pioneering study of phonology, however, Trubetzkoy (1939:59ff) 
distinguished different types of oppositions from several points of view. These 
distinctions are based on his important insight, often forgotten in later 
semiotics, that an opposition between several terms must suppose some kind 
of similarity, a base of comparison, as well as properties which are different. 
Thus, an opposition is one-dimensional, if the base of comparison is only 
found in two items, but otherwise multi-dimensional (e.g. the common factor 
in the Latin letters “E” vs. “F” is not found elsewhere, but the one present in 
“P” vs. “R” also appears in “B”). On the other hand, an opposition is 
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proportional if the distinction between the terms is found in other pairs of 
elements, or else isolated (some irregular plurals, like “goose/geese” and 
“tooth/teeth” are proportional, as are even more obviously the regular ones). 
In privative oppositions, one of the terms simply consists in the 
absence of the trait found in the other term (in phonetics, unvoiced sounds as 
opposed to voiced ones, in semantics the plural “s” opposed to the lack of it). 
An equipollent opposition, on the other hand, means that both terms are 
something in themselves (irregular singular/plural modification like “foot” vs. 
“feet”, where the singular in not just the absence of plurality marking). In 
gradual oppositions, finally, some feature is present in different degrees in 
several terms (a example is the traditional phonetic description of the degree 
of aperture in vowels). This latter distinction would seem to correspond to the 
logical one between contradictory and contrary terms, adding the case in 
which some points between the extremes are singled out for consideration. In 
the final case, the opposition in not binary: it has more than two terms. 
Roman Jakobson’s heritage is, in this domain, extremely 
ambiguous: he was the first one to show that, at least in phonology, all 
oppositions may be reduced to the binary, privative kind. This supposes the 
resolution of one non-binary, equipollent opposition into a set of binary, 
privative ones, itself based on a redefinition of the categories entering the 
opposition. In the case of phonological features, Jakobson, Fant, and Halle 
(1952) have shown that these categories may be justified from an acoustic 
point of view; whether they are also perceptually relevant is an open 
question. In any case, it does not follow that the reduction to binary, privative 
oppositions is adequate outside the domain of linguistic expression. 
Paradoxically, it was Jakobson (1976) himself who, in his 1942 lectures at the 
New School of Social Research in New York, countered Saussure’s idea that 
also semantic oppositions were purely negative: contrary to the Saussurean 
claim, not the whole meaning of the words “night” and “day” is derived from 
their opposition. Yet, Claude Lévi-Strauss, who listened to these lectures, 
later brought the idea of oppositions being purely negative, binary and 
privative to what would seem to be an even more saturated domain, myths, 
and also, in his mask analyses, to visual semiotics. Jakobson and Lévi-
Strauss together heavily influenced what in known as French structuralism 
into conceiving all oppositions as being purely privative, and this idea still 
lingers on in the work of the Greimas school. 
In fact, the kind of oppositions discovered by Structuralism in myths, 
literary works, pictures, and cultures, are, on many counts, very different from 
those present in the expression system of verbal language. Even 
Trubetzkoy’s classifications turns out to be of little help when trying to 
understand these differences. Oppositions may be constitutive of the identity 
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of signs and/or their parts, as are the features of phonology, or they may be 
merely regulative in relation to an already constituted identity, which would 
seem to be true of many other cases, such as two pictures, or two objects in 
a picture, already identified as representing something. Thus, Lévi-Strauss 
(1975) is certainly wrong in arguing that the meaning of the Swaihwé and 
Dzonokwa masks derives entirely from their mutual opposition: this 
opposition, if opposition there is, is only secondary to our recognition of both 
as (aberrant) faces. 
If binarity can be introduced as a limitation on oppositional kinds, 
there is no reason for not allowing other kinds of restrictions. Many of 
Trubetzkoy’s opposition types are in fact organized by threes. Charles 
Sanders Peirce could be said, in this sense, to be a defender of trinary 
structuralism. In all its manifestations, Secondness is only what it is in relation 
to Firstness and Secondness, and vice-versa. It might however be better not 
to fix the possible number of terms in a structure, as was apparently 
Saussure’s original intuition. 
 
 
1.3. Oppositions and identities 
Oppositions may be in absentia, or oppositions strictly speaking, or 
in praesentia, or contrasts. In pictures there is no obvious equivalent to the 
system of (constitutive) oppositions present in the phonological and semantic 
organisations of verbal language. Rather than deriving from the system, 
oppositions are created on the spot, i.e. in a given “text”. Most oppositions 
found by Structuralists in poetry, visual art, advertisements, myths, and so 
on, are really of this kind. However, it should be noted that oppositions in 
absentia are not necessarily systemic: they may refer to another “text”. An 
advertisement, or a “postmodern” artwork, can make use of the fact that there 
is a large stock of pictures which we, as members of Western culture, tend to 
recognise, and position itself as forming a set of oppositions and identities in 
relations to one such picture. Using a familiar but vague term, this kind of 
oppositions in absentia could be called intertextual (cf. Sonesson 1989:76ff). 
Thus, for instance, the advertisement for a brand of socks called 
Kindy could at first be mistaken for the poster, or a still, from the well-known 
Marilyn Monroe movie “The seven year itch”: in particular, it reminds us of the 
familiar scene in which Marilyn’s skirt is lifted by the stream coming from the 
air-valve (reproduced and thoroughly analysed in Sonesson 1989 and 1992). 
But there are many, more or less notable, differences: thus, for instance, 
Marilyn’s dress has a deep décolletage, is tight-fitting, displays naked 
shoulders, and is lifted by air stream in a circle shape (in the still) or in the 
shape of a scroll (on the poster). The dress of the Kindy girl, on the other 
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hand, shows no décolletage, is rather loose, covers the shoulders, and hangs 
straight down. There are also differences between the positions of the man 
and the woman, some Marilyn-properties having been transferred to the 
Kindy man, as well as from the man with Marilyn to the Kindy woman.  
It should be clear that what triggers the comparison which leads to 
the derivation of a series of opposition is an original near-identity, or perhaps 
rather, a series of partial identities. As compared to Trubetskoy’s “base of 
comparison”, the similarities are here much more foregrounded. It could even 
be said that, on the level of configurations, Marilyn and the Kindy girl, as well 
as their male counterparts, are seen as identities, but on the level of the 
ensuing structural comparison, they appear as being opposed on many 
respects.  
Not only oppositions may be absent or present in the given text: it is 
possible to take the difference between oppositions, properly speaking, and 
contrasts a step further. In the visual rhetoric conceived by Groupe µ (1992), 
all figures consist of two units which may be cross-classified as being in 
absentia or in praesentia, and conjoint or disjoint.2 The similarities, which 
were the base of comparison in the oppositions, have here been 
foregrounded. 
In the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (1939, 174ff; 1950, 238ff) 
both oppositions and entities form paired associations, or couplings (in a 
more general sense, thus, when in the work of Groupe µ), when both items 
are directly present (in praesentia); they are an appresented pairing, or 
simply an appresentation, when one of the items is present and the other is 
not (in absentia); and an appresentation becomes a sign when it is the 
absent item which is the theme (cf. Luckman 1980; 205ff.).3 In semiotics, we 
are familiar with couplings and appresented pairings, in the form of iconic 
relations or iconicities, indexical relations or indexicalities, and symbolic 
relations or symbolicities.  
 
2. Structuralism on a lifeworld foundation 
By inventing structural anthropology, Claude Lévi-Strauss was 
certainly instrumental in introducing Structuralism into semiotics. And yet, one 
may wonder whether Lévi-Strauss really grasped the concept of structure, as 
used in linguistics (and defined above in 1.1.). It is of course impossible to 
check all the numerous analyses realised by Lévi-Strauss, to find out if they 
really involve structures in this sense, which is clearly what Lévi-Strauss 
himself believes. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that, whatever Lévi-
Strauss himself claims, the terms that he employs are never purely formal.  
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2.1. The logic of qualities 
In comparing the two “great structuralists” Piaget and Lévi–Strauss, 
the soon to be pioneer of cognitive science Howard Gardner (1973: 194f) 
affirms that, within the “logic of qualities”, Piaget is dedicated to the logic, but 
Lévi-Strauss to the qualities. In Piagetean terms, the former pertains to 
operativity, and the latter to figurativity. In fact, according to Lévi-Strauss’ own 
interpretation, it is not the qualities but the logic that is important. Not that this 
logic is so peculiar: Lévi-Strauss (1962:24ff) claims that the kinds of 
“structure” encountered in the sciences on one hand, and in mythology and 
magic on the other, are identical or similar, while qualities accounted for are 
different, science being limited to the “primary qualities” and mythology 
including also the “secondary” ones, which are directly perceivable. Actually, 
what distinguishes Lévi-Strauss from earlier theorists on mythology and ritual 
is the emphasis given to the systematic character in “primitive thinking”. 
And yet there are also many other passages in which Lévi-Strauss 
announces that his object of study is “la logique des qualités sensibles” or “la 
science du concret” (cf. Lévi–Strauss 1962; interview in Bellour & Clement 
1979:157–210). Again, when Lévi-Strauss (1978:13) defines the logic of the 
concrete as “the respect for and the use of the data of the senses”, as well as 
when he (in Bellour & Clément 1979:186f) mentions “la prégnance du détail” 
as something typical of the myth, he certainly goes in the sense of figurativity. 
The fact that certain particular qualities tend to return in the myths over and 
over again, certainly seems to mean that these qualities, at least, count as 
such: nature and culture, for instance, the raw and the cooked, and the 
different problems of communication expressed in the Grail type and the 
Oedipus type of myths. As against this, again, Lévi-Strauss is quite explicit in 
his argument for the arbitrariness in the choice of qualities figuring in the 
myths: they have only positional or differential value, like the phonemes, he 
tells us; just as the phonemes in the word “sun” are meaningless separately 
and may be used in other words with quite different meanings, so, according 
to Lévi-Strauss, the content “sun” in its turn is meaningless relative to 
mythology, outside a particular “mytheme” (cf. Lévi-Strauss 1958:320f; 
1983:174ff, 198ff; 1984:104, 249, 257).4 Lévi-Strauss (1958:320) even 
censors Jung for attributing a meaning to the “symbols” themselves, taking 
exception to the theories of Lévy-Bruhl, which, at least in a general sense, 
lend themselves more readily to an interpretation in terms of figurativity 
(1962:299, 319). 
Things as different as the sheep's horns, the eagle's claw, and 
certain parts of different kinds of mollusc, may occupy the same place in a 
myth, according to Lévi-Strauss (1983:185), because they have in common 
the property of being “des organes qu'on retranche de l'animal avant de le 
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consommer, ou dont on retranche une partie avant de les consommer”. If that 
is the case, these features are certainly not put together arbitrarily. The 
topological concept of separation seems important here, but something more 
is a stake, since what is separated is a part of a whole, but not just any part, 
but a part that is in some sense supplementary to the core, an appendage, 
which is often a protuberant part.  
More obscure, because of its very abstractness, is the opposition 
between the Oedipus type of myth, characterized by excessive 
communication, and the Grail type of myth, where there is too little 
communication (Lévi-Strauss 1984:135ff). Instances of the former are the 
resolution of the riddle, the explosion of the natural cycles, as exemplified by 
the plague, and incest (cf. Lévi–Strauss 1983:314f). Instances of the latter, 
more numerous, are answers offered to questions never asked, which is the 
opposite of the riddle, reduced capacity to move, self-imposed mutism, an 
earth without fertility, the virgin who never smiles, the beheaded body, and a 
broken sword, the latter two objects said to signify failure to communicate 
with oneself and with others, respectively. If we consider the Grail instances, 
we will find two classes, one in which the nature of things is invoked and a 
deviation registered, and one in which a well-known part fails to lead on to 
the expected whole continuously. Perhaps we may generalize by stating that 
there is some regularity of the Lifeworld that is expected to obtain, and a 
deviation from this regularity, which is different, according to whether the 
regularity concerns ordinary things, such as a sword or a body, or 
fundamental categories like humanity, femininity, and Nature. In both cases, 
the elementary global property of continuity fails to obtain as expected, either 
spatially, in the simple objects, or temporally, in relation to a single preceding 
event, as in the case of the answer or to a string of recurrent behaviours, as 
in all other cases.5 
These are not properties that have a name in any known language. 
But they could certainly be configurational properties in the sense of the 
Leipzig school (see 1.1) – or what was later called “physiognomic properties” 
(Werner & Kaplan 1963). As hinted above, they are often topological in 
character, corresponding to the pre-Euclidean space of children’s experience, 
according to Piaget (et al. 1948). We may grant Lévi-Strauss that there is 
some kind of opposition playing a part here, but so do a number of identity 
relations. Once we realise that some of these things, when brought together, 
may, in the first case, be seen as appendages being separate from a main 
body part, it is easier to realise that some other things may be perceived as 
the result of the opposite operation. There is a certain arbitrariness to this 
interplay of oppositions and identities, but not in the linguistic sense of lack of 
meaning. The common meaning of one of the assorted group of objects must 
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be perceived, more or less provisionally, before the opposition can have its 
course. But the arbitrariness is not complete. Whether this organization is 
found in the universal human mind or in only that of Lévi-Strauss must be left 
open (as it is by Lévi-Strauss himself). But as long as we can reconstruct the 
thinking of this mind, it cannot be completely arbitrary. In this sense, the logic 
of qualities is abductive, rather than structural. 
2.2. Lévi-Strauss on the Northwest Coast masks 
Not being a specialist in mythology, I prefer to scrutinize more 
closely an analysis by Lévi-Strauss in which he is concerned with visual 
semiotics. It involves a couple of ritual masks stemming from the American 
Northwest Coast (reproduced in Lévi-Strauss 1975 and Sonesson 1989; 
1992). In this analysis, Lévi-Strauss is very careful to spell out the analytical 
operations that he goes through to derive the opposition between the two 
masks. I have two problems with this. First of all, I do not think Lévi-Strauss 
uses the proper procedure to demonstrate the presence of a structure, in the 
linguistic sense of the term. In fact he does exactly the opposite. In the 
second place, I think a purely structural analysis would be abusive in this 
context. We must start much closer to home. The masks are immediately 
perceived as a kind of faces – and more or less at the same time as deviant 
faces. The analysis must therefore start out from the face prototype.  
From the observation of the properties of the first mask, the 
Swaihwé mask, Lévi-Strauss claims to derive not only the existence, but also 
the relevant properties, of another one, the so-called Dzonokwa mask. But in 
linguistic structuralism, one item is not derived from another one, but the 
properties of several items, known to exist within the system, are re-
described from the point of view of their mutual opposition. 
According to Lévi-Strauss’ (1975, I: 32ff) description, the Swaihwé 
mask has a wide-open mouth, its lower jaw is dropping with an enormous 
tongue lolling out, the eyes are protuberant, the predominant colour is white, 
and its decoration consists in bird feathers. This mask only acquires meaning 
in relation to another one, Lévi-Strauss assures us, and the properties of the 
missing mask can be deduced from those of the one observed: it will be 
black, and instead of feathers it will have hair; its eyes should be sunken, and 
the mouth must have a shape which does not permit the tongue to show (p. 
102f). It so happens that this mask can be found among the members of a 
neighbouring tribe: it is the Dzonokwa mask.  
Thus, the result of Lévi-Strauss analysis is precisely the kind of 
description that would have been censored by the linguistic structuralist: one 
that is not true to the internal workings of the sign system. Applying Lévi-
Strauss’ reasoning to language, we would be able to demonstrate, much to 
the surprise of all Japanese, that there is a distinction between the sounds “r” 
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and “l” in their language, or that there exists an opposition between “r” and 
“rr” in English, just as in Spanish. In a structure, the categories are derived 
from the relation obtaining between them. At first, the elements may be 
interpreted according to common world-knowledge; but once they are placed 
together, their common and opposed features are extracted; and these 
features serve to redefine the elements according to a new principle of 
relevance. This is how one gets from sounds to phonemes in linguistics. 
Lévi-Strauss’ analysis of the Northwest Coast masks does not follow 
these procedures. Instead, Lévi-Strauss really applies the rule Peirce calls 
abduction: from one case, the Swaihwé mask, he draws conclusions about 
another case, the Dzonokwa mask, based on a regularity taken for granted. 
More strictly, it could be said that the terms are deduced from the full list of 
properties more or less implicitly present in the elements and their co-
presence in some system. Not so in Lévi-Strauss’ analysis: the first element 
is used to predict the second in virtue of regularities which are not justified, 
and which have no source in the relations between the masks. The masks 
are first of all seen iconically, as faces.  Faces, however, are not just any odd 
objects: they are particularly important to human beings. Infants recognize 
faces at a very early stage, even when the features are scrambled. Indeed, 
while is has been suggested that infants react to certain shapes, common to 
real faces and scrambled one, Easterbrook (et al. 1999) showed than even 
new-born could discriminate the categories. There is even speculation that a 
special area of the brain may be responsible for face recognition. Even to 
adults, only a few lines are needed to suggest a face, whereas much more 
determination, or a “key”, must be provided to make any other meaning 
recognizable (cf. Sonesson 1996). 
Nevertheless, the masks are also directly perceived as deviant 
faces. The mask is seen as a face but a face which is located far away from 
the prototypical case: in fact, it is seen to exaggerate some of the traits of 
faces idea-typically. This implicit relationship to the facial prototype explains 
the units into which Lévi-Strauss segments the masks: they are simply the 
units of real faces. Between the facial prototype and the idealtype 
encountered by Lévi-Strauss, the Swaihwé mask, there is really a structural 
opposition: however, because of the well-known prototypicality of the first, the 
second is seen to be deviant on a number of dimensions.6 All that Lévi-
Strauss now has to do is to extract the features which are different from a 
real face in the mask, to place them on a dimensional scale, on which the 
values of the facial prototype constitute the middle term and those of the 
mask one of the extremes, and then derive the other mask by exaggerating 
all the values in the opposite direction from the facial prototype. The only 
remaining task is then to find the mask somewhere in the real world. This 
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reasoning, however, is really an abduction from two cases to a third. Thus, it 
must be based on Lifeworld regularities. 
Not all of these depend on the facial prototype. Since white is the 
colour which predominates in the Swaihwé mask, Lévi-Strauss tells us the 
other mask must be black. There is a real regularity of human perception 
underlying this, though Lévi-Strauss does not pause to tell us so: languages 
having only two colour terms will distinguish black and white, which is thus 
the primary opposition, not only of language but of human colour experience, 
as shown by Berlin & Kay (cf. Miller & Johnson-Laird 1976:346ff). To talk 
about the whiteness of the mask, however, is to use a dominance concept: 
but how do we know that the white parts of the mask dominate the black 
ones, if it is not a question of relative space occupation?  
Next we are told that the opposite term of feathers must be hair, if it 
is something originating in the animal realm (p. 103). Again, it should be 
evident that the presupposed common basis of the opposition between 
feathers and hair must include many more features than that of animality, for 
many objects besides hair have an animal origin and are different from 
feathers. If the relevant additional feature were just the property of covering 
the surface of the body, scale and lack of hair would be other possibilities.  
Since the eyes of the Swaihwé mask are protuberant, those of the 
Dzonokwa mask should have the opposite property. What Lévi-Strauss (p. 
105f, 119) actually predicts is that the elementary geometrical properties of 
concavity and convexity will oppose each other in the eyes of the two masks. 
But if we look at the Dzonokwa mask we will find that gaps, rather than 
concavities, serve as eyes. This equivalence of holes and concavities would 
seem to necessitate an elaborate explanation in that “logic of qualities” which 
is simply presupposed by Lévi-Strauss (cf. 2.1.). 
Again, since the Swaihwé mask supposedly has a wide-open mouth 
with the lower jaw drooping in a manner that exposes an enormous tongue, 
the other mask will present a mouth so shaped that no tongue could be 
extended through it. Apparently the extended tongue is here taken to be the 
relevant feature, while the wide-open mouth and the hanging jaw are 
interpreted as redundant traits, mechanically following from the position of the 
tongue. There are many other possible opposite terms to an extended 
tongue, for instance a tongue that is wound up, which could then very well be 
seen inside the mouth. But if we now look at the two masks it seems too 
much of an overstatement to suggest that the Swaihwé mask has its mouth 
wide-open; on the other hand, we will find that the Dzonokwa mask, though 
pouting its lips, really has a wide-open mouth — and it is not clear why no 
tongue could be extended through it. 
In all these cases, it will be noted, structure is not enough to explain 
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the relationships postulated by Lévi-Strauss, and further justifications are 
necessary. Only in the case of the opposition black vs. white did it turn out to 
be relatively easy to find the Lifeworld regularity justifying the abduction.7 
It may be easier to find a structural opposition on the global level, 
i.e. among the non-configurational holistic properties (cf. 1.1). In fact, Lévi-
Strauss (p. 105ff, 119) suggests that the masks are opposed as concavity to 
convexity. It should be noted that these categories, if valid, can only be 
dominance concepts: the nose, for instance, is convex in both masks, as well 
as in real faces, and the mouth of the Dzonokawa is as convex on the outside 
as it is “concave” inside. Another opposition at the global level is the one 
between order and disorder mentioned above.  
So far, we have tried to spell out the regularities that would justify 
the Lévi-Straussian abductions, and we have found them to be presupposed 
rather than proved to exist. This does not mean that some of them could not 
be justified, either by further studies in the relevant culture, or in the “logic of 
qualities” characteristic of the workings of the “human mind” (cf. 2.2). But they 
are certainly not derivable from the “structures” presented by Lévi-Strauss. 
 
 
 
3. Conclusions 
In the present essay, I have tried to show that structures exist, but 
they are never enough. Putative structuralists, I have suggested, actually 
take a lot of the world outside the structure for granted. Often, there are only 
regularities of the Lifeworld, discovered by abductions, and no structure in the 
formal sense of the term. In spite of his aspirations, Lévi-Strauss really 
seems to be dealing in physiognomic properties, although he has certainly 
advanced our understanding of these properties beyond the conception of 
Levy-Bruhl, adding to the latter’s “primitive mentality” a certain streak of 
regularity, grasped by abduction. And even when there is a real structure, it 
can only exist from the point of view outside the structure. The context is 
another text. But the world is irreducibly contextual (Sonesson 1978). Once 
you make something into a text, another context is created outside it. But 
however far you go into textualisation, there is always the subject and his/her 
Lifeworld lurking outside. 
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1 Bertil Malmberg, the director of my doctoral thesis in linguistics, was an expert on the 
structuralist tradition, which I understood when I went to France in the 70s, where his 
introductory books were obligatory reading, and in Mexico, in the 80s, where they still 
played an important part. His own position was somewhere between the extremism of 
Louis Hjelmslev and the rather common sense point of view of André Martinet. More 
exactly, he thought both stands were valid for different purposes. 
2 For a critical review of this model, see Sonesson 1996, 2010. 
3  For details on this approach, now see Sonesson 2011 
4 It goes without saying that this parallel is unacceptable, no matter what else we 
conclude. See Sonesson 1989 on the confusion concerning the first and the second 
articulation in the linguistic sense. 
5 Nevertheless, it would be easy to point out numerous instances of what would seem 
to be lack of communication in the Oedipus myth, and vice-versa. 
6 The term “prototype” is used as before in the sense of Rosch. Following our analysis 
of Max Weber’s use of the term in Sonesson 1989:71ff, we use “idealtype” to stand for 
an exaggerated rending of characteristic properties, which may include contradictions. 
7 There are a number of interesting differences between the masks that are simply 
ignored by Lévi-Strauss, for no obvious reason: those of ears and nose, for example. 
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